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AN INITIAL, BUT POSITIVE, STEP 






On December 18, 2015, the President signed the Consolidated Appropria-
tions Act, 2016 (Omnibus) into law. Title I of Division N of the Omnibus 
contains the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 (CISA). This 
Article presents insights on the interpretation, intended operation, and sig-
nificance of CISA from the  perspective of a key architect of this important 




A.  Understanding the Cyber Threat 
 
Cyber attacks are not a new phenomenon. For years, government and 
private sector experts have warned of growing threats, the massive theft  
of intellectual property to cyber espionage, and billions of dollars being lost 
by the U.S. economy. The former head of the National Security Agency 
(NSA) called cyber espionage the “greatest transfer of wealth in history.”1 
With the annual cost of cybercrime and cyber espionage to the world 
economy estimated at more than $375 billion,2 the “rise of the sophisticated 
cyber criminal is the fastest growing security threat to organizations and 
individuals.”3 
Cyber attacks are now commonplace enough that, in 2014, James 
Comey, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), testified 
before Congress that “[t]here’re two kinds of big companies in the United 
States: those who have been hacked by the Chinese and those who don’t yet 
																																								 																				
*Saxby Chambliss is Partner at DLA Piper; former U.S. Senator (2003-2015); and former 
United States Representative (1995-2003).  
1 Gen. Keith B. Alexander, Dir., Nat’l Sec. Agency, Remarks at American Enterprise 
Institute (July 9, 2012), https://www.aei.org/events/cybersecurity-and-american-power/.   
2 CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES, NET LOSSES: ESTIMATING THE GLOBAL COST OF 
CYBERCRIME 6 (June 2014), http://csis.org/files/attachments/140609_rp_economic_impact 
_cybercrime_report.pdf.  
3 Jeffrey S. Price & Justin D. Wear, Claims Made and Insurance Coverage Available for 
Losses Arising out of or Related to Electronic Data, 51:1 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 
51, 52 (2015). 
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know they’ve been hacked by the Chinese.”4 Consider the high-profile 
attacks in recent years against restaurants, banks, health insurance companies, 
social media, retailers, and the Internal Revenue Service and the Office of 
Personnel Management. Each attack reminds us that cyber incidents can 
happen against anyone, anywhere, at any time. 
Today, law enforcement learns of a large-scale data breach “close to 
every two to three days”—a notable change from the two to three weeks of 
years past.5
 
There is no single answer for this sharp increase. Certainly, the 
same technological advances that facilitate communication, enhance 
productivity, and improve our quality of life have created more opport-
unities for malicious actors and inadvertent cybersecurity compromises. 
Even as many organizations look to fortify their computer networks and 
information systems, not all are prepared.6 Organizations-including the 
government-naturally weigh potential risks against the costs and 
benefits of enhanced security. Some are “soft targets,” providing smart 
and tech-savvy malicious actors with multiple avenues for exploitation. 
Adding to the complexity, some victims may be reluctant to publicize 
incidents;7 this, in turn, can create a false sense of security for consumers, 
employees, or others. Then there are the threat actors themselves-nation 
states, organized crime, individual hackers-actively exploiting vulnerabilities 
for malicious purposes. 
Compounding all of this is the fact that data is everywhere. Financial, 
healthcare, corporate, and government information are now favorite targets 
of malicious actors.8 Moreover, ransomware, data manipulation, and even 
hacks of the personal emails of high-ranking government officials are on the 
																																								 																				
4 Sen. Patrick J. Leahy Holds a Hearing on FBI Oversight: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2014) (testimony of James B. Comey, Director of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation). 
5 Elise Viebeck, FBI: Data Breaches ‘Increasing Substantially,’ THE HILL (May 14, 2015, 
03:01 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/242110-fbi-official-data-breaches-increa 
sing-substantially (quoting remarks by James Trainor). 
6 See PONEMON INST., THE CYBER RESILIENT ORGANIZATION: LEARNING TO THRIVE 
AGAINST THREATS 2 (Sept. 2015), https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/427640/RS_Content/ 
Reports/The_Cyber_Resilient_Enterprise_Ponemon_Report.pdf (noting that over 60% of 
respondents say that their organization either does not have a cybersecurity incident response 
plan or has only an “ad hoc” plan). 
7 Jacob J. Lew, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Remarks at Delivering Alpha Conference 
Hosted by CNBC and Institutional Investor (July 16, 2014), https://www.treasury.gov/press-
center/press-releases/Pages/jl2570.aspx.  
8 See, e.g., SYMANTEC, 2015 INTERNET SECURITY THREAT REPORT VOL. 20 (Apr. 2015), 
https://www4.symantec.com/mktginfo/whitepaper/ISTR/21347932_GA-internet-securityt 
hreat-report-volume-20-2015-social_v2.pdf (broadly examining the threats faced across 
industries). 
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rise.9 But stealing data is just one motivation for cyber attacks. Consider the 
attacks on Sony and the Las Vegas Sands Corporation. Believed to be 
attributable to hostile foreign governments,10 these attacks not only  
caused substantial financial loss but inflicted permanent damage on the 
victims’ computer networks. These attacks are deeply disturbing from a 
national security standpoint. We know foreign governments seek the 
intellectual property of American companies, but we are not accustomed to 
such blatant, malicious, and destructive attacks on our companies for 
political reasons. 
The severity of cyber attacks may also be exacerbated by our own 
delays in detecting incidents. For example, in 2008, Heartland Payment 
Systems was breached resulting in the ultimate exposure of the personal 
information of 130 million people; yet, no one discovered the intrusion  
until 2009.11  In its 2015 M-Trends Report, Mandiant placed the “median 
number of days that threat groups were present on a victim’s network  
before detection” at 205 days, with the longest presence at 2,982 days.12 We 
simply cannot defeat or prevent a threat if we lack the capacity or the will to 
know it exists. 
 
B. Why Information Sharing Matters 
 
Against this evolving threat, the costs associated with cyber attacks 
are escalating.13  There is also the well-placed concern about the “Brand” of 
a victim company. As a result, cybersecurity is becoming a key topic in 
																																								 																				
9 Global Cybersecurity Threats: Hearing Before the H. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 114th 
Cong. (2015) (statement of James Clapper, Director of National Intelligence) (“I believe the 
next push of the envelope is going to be the manipulation or the deletion of data which would 
of course compromise its integrity.”). 
10 Emily Flitter & Mark Hosenball, FBI Says Sony Hackers “Got Sloppy," Posted from North 
Korea Addresses, REUTERS (Jan. 7, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-
cyberattack-usa-fbi-idUSKBN0KG1V220150107.  
11 Rachel King, Lessons from the Data Breach at Heartland, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS 
(July 6, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2009-07-06/lessons-from-
the-data-breach-at-heartlandbusinessweek-business-news-stock-market-and-financia 
l-advice.   
12 MANDIANT, M-TRENDS 2015: A VIEW FROM THE FRONT LINES 3 (2015), https://www 
2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-m-trends-2015.pdf.  
13 According to a 2015 study released by IBM and the Ponemon Institute, the average cost 
per record stolen in a breach in the United States is $217, with a total average cost per 
incident of $6.5 million. PONEMON INST., 2015 COST OF DATA BREACH STUDY: GLOBAL 
ANALYSIS (May 2015), http://www-01.ibm.com/common/ssi/cgi-bin/ssialias?subtype= 
WH&infotype=SA&htmlfid=SEW03053WWEN&attachment=SEW03053WWEN.PDF.  
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American boardrooms,14 and has captured the attention of federal and state 
regulators and class action lawyers. Many organizations and the government 
are searching for solutions, including insurance, compliance programs, data 
policies, incident response plans, and improved security. While no silver 
bullet will prevent all cyber attacks, one legislative measure took on new 
urgency in recent years. 
It may seem intuitive that companies should be able to share cyber 
threat information with each other, learning about the threats each faces. 
Companies not adequately investing in cybersecurity could benefit from 
understanding the threats being inflicted upon their competitors, partners, or 
affiliates. Companies that are investing in cybersecurity may not only be role 
models for others, but as threats change, can more appropriately tailor their 
own security investments. 
It may also seem natural for private entities to share insight with the 
federal government, enabling law enforcement and intelligence agencies  
to enhance their understanding of cyber threats by linking this insight  
with classified or other sensitive information. This analysis can, in turn, be 
shared with the private sector, equipping them to better detect and prevent 
malicious activity.15 
Yet, until just a few months ago, significant legal restrictions 
undermined the ability of private entities to effectively counter new and 
challenging threats by sharing cyber threat information. From antitrust laws 
that could be interpreted to prevent such private collaboration, to freedom of 
information laws that could leave proprietary information shared with the 
government vulnerable to disclosure, our laws simply discouraged these simple 
exchanges of information. Nor did our laws provide companies with liability 
protection from potential lawsuits, a void made more obvious by the years of 
litigation faced by telecommunications companies following the disclosure of 
the post-9/11 Terrorist Surveillance Program. In spite of these significant risks, 
some private entities voluntarily took part over the years in cyber task forces 
and various information sharing relationships. However, it eventually became 
apparent that such participation was unlikely to increase without legislation 
granting clear sharing authorities and better legal safeguards. 
 
																																								 																				
14 See NYSE GOVERNANCE SERVICES, A 2015 SURVEY: CYBERSECURITY IN THE 
BOARDROOM (2015), https://www.nyse.com/publicdocs/VERACODE_Survey_Report.pdf.  
15 Joseph Lawler, Fallout Coming from JP Morgan Hack Attack, WASH. EXAMINER (Oct. 14, 
2014), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/fallout-coming-from-jpmorgan-hack-attack/artic 
le/2554755 (“We need help and [need to continue] working together with the government . . . 
The government knows more than we do.”) (quoting JPMorgan CEO Jamie Dimon). 
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C. Where is the Federal Government? 
 
During the lengthy congressional debate about information sharing 
legislation, the federal government, especially the NSA, faced criticism 
following the leaks of classified information by Edward Snowden. This 
criticism impacted the cyber debate as NSA became a favorite target for 
conjecture and unfounded accusations, leading some to oppose any effort 
to give them direct access to cyber threat information. It is possible that a 
bill that simply addressed private-to-private sharing or significantly 
reduced the role of the NSA and other non-civilian agencies might have 
been enacted much sooner. But given the vital role that our law 
enforcement, military, and intelligence agencies share in countering this 
threat-a threat that originates from nation states, terrorists, organized crime, 
and lone hackers alike-passing such a limited bill would have been 
counterproductive. 
Throughout most of this debate, I served both as a Member and the 
Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), and 
as a Member of the Senate Armed Services Committee. I saw firsthand the 
extraordinary cyber assets, capabilities, and knowledge of the U.S. 
Government, especially the NSA, which has been blessed with solid 
leadership and highly trained professionals. Other Intelligence Community 
agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence 
Agency, and intelligence elements at the FBI and Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) play key roles in collecting, developing, and analyzing cyber 
intelligence. These agencies are very good at what they do. The FBI’s law 
enforcement capabilities and interactions with the private sector are vital, as 
are the efforts of the Secret Service. Our challenge, then, as policy makers, 
was to find a process by which all relevant federal agencies could work 
together as seamlessly as possible to protect the nation against the daily 
barrage of cyber attacks. 
 
II. PRIOR LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS 
 
As the cyber threat increased, the SSCI and other committees of 
jurisdiction considered legislative and oversight measures that would 
improve the government’s cybersecurity posture and encourage better 
coordination and communication among private sector entities and by and 
with the federal government. While Congress passed some discrete cyber 
provisions, no bill provided the comprehensive liability protections and 
flexibility needed to effectively change the status quo. In 2012, however, two 
bills garnered the attention of the Senate.  
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A. Lieberman/Collins Bill 
 
From the beginning, the Lieberman/Collins bill was problematic. In 
spite of the good intentions of its lead sponsors, including Senator Feinstein, 
there were just too many drawbacks. The bill included everything from DHS 
mandates and the potential for more regulation to more government programs 
and an Internet “kill switch.” Amid valid questions about DHS’s capabilities, 
there was considerable reluctance to give DHS even more authority. The bill 
also would have sidelined the NSA and FBI in the sharing of cyber threat 
information. Further, the complexity of the bill’s information sharing 
provisions and insufficient liability protections might have discouraged, 
rather than encouraged, broader collaboration. In short, many, including 
businesses on the front lines of cyber attacks, opposed the bill because it 
lacked the necessary options, flexibility, and liability protections. For these 
and other reasons, the bill was ultimately defeated in the Senate during the 
final months of 2012. 
 
B. Secure It 
 
The competing bill in the Senate, known as SECURE IT, had broad 
support from the business community. I was a co-author of this bill, 
specifically the information sharing provisions, along with Minority Leader 
McConnell, Senator McCain, Senator Burr, and other Ranking Members. 
Privacy groups, however, opposed the bill because of its strong liability 
protections and authorities for sharing information with government agencies 
such as the FBI and NSA. Ultimately, the Majority Leader refused to give the 
bill its own floor time for debate. 
 
C. Origins of the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act 
 
Although no bill was enacted in 2012, it was clear that cybersecurity, 
particularly the sharing of threat and intrusion information, was critical to our 
national security. Senator Feinstein, as the Chairman of the SSCI, and I, as 
the Vice Chairman, resolved to overcome our differences and find a path 
forward. Agreeing that neither her information sharing provisions in the 
Lieberman/Collins bill nor mine in SECURE IT would gamer enough votes 
in the Senate, we committed to finding common ground. The Committee 
subsequently held dozens of meetings, hearings, and briefings with 
government and private sector representatives and privacy advocates.  
In August 2014, the final version of our agreed-upon bill, the 
Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (CISA), was voted out of the 
SSCI by a 14-3 margin, a remarkable result considering the divided 
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atmosphere in the Senate at the time. Unfortunately, the Majority Leader 
would not bring the bill to the floor for debate and disposition so the 2014 
version of CISA died when Congress adjourned. 
 
III. A POSITIVE STEP: CISA 2015 
 
When the 114th Congress convened in 2015, Senator Burr and 
Senator Feinstein­ as the respective Chairman and Vice Chairman of the 
SSCI, revived CISA. The Committee again held meetings, hearings, and 
briefings with stakeholders. Senators Burr and Feinstein negotiated with 
the White House and other Senators to make bipartisan changes to the 
bill. The result: CISA passed the Senate by an overwhelming bipartisan 
vote of 74-21; negotiations were held with counterparts in the U.S. House; 
and congressional leadership, in particular Majority Leader McConnell, 
attached CISA to the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016 and sent 
it to the President for signature in December 2015. Senators Burr and 
Feinstein deserve tremendous credit for their leadership in getting this much­ 
needed and long-overdue bill enacted into law. 
 
A. The Purpose of CISA 
 
In order to understand the importance of CISA, it is first necessary to 
understand what it is not. CISA is not a surveillance bill. It provides no 
additional authority regarding government surveillance or intrusions by 
private entities. Rather, it is entirely voluntary, imposing no coercion, 
penalty, or other liability if a private entity decides not to share information. 
CISA’s core purpose has always been to encourage voluntary sharing of 
information while providing vital liability and antitrust protections and 




In my experience, definitions are the heart of national security 
legislation. CISA is no exception and its carefully defined key terms include 
“appropriate Federal entities;” “cybersecurity purpose;” “cybersecurity 
threat;” “cyber threat indicator;” “defensive measure;” and “private entity.” 
Some of CISA’s definitions were drawn from SECURE IT, some from 
Lieberman-Collins, and others were the product of lengthy negotiations with 
privacy and business groups. Other terms, such as “personal information” and 
“real-time” were not defined; however, there was consensus to give them 
their ordinary meanings. Importantly, CISA intentionally avoided the “near-
real-time” construct of some other bills, emphasizing instead that all of the 
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defined federal agencies must be on the same playing field, receiving and 





At the center of CISA is the authority for private entities to identify 
threats and develop or use protective measures. CISA confirms that private 
entities may operate defensive measures on, and monitor, their own 
information systems or those of consenting customers or suppliers for 
cybersecurity purposes. As described below, private entities may also share 
with and receive from private and governmental entities cyber threat 
indicators and defensive measures. In developing the authorities and methods 
for private sector sharing, CISA carefully considered privacy concerns while 
mindful of how threats are detected and analyzed. Private entities that choose 
to avail themselves of CISA’s authorities must comply with lawful 
restrictions, implement security controls to protect against unauthorized 
access, and take steps to remove known personal information not directly 
related to a cybersecurity threat. 
 
D. Methods of Sharing 
 
CISA covers the full spectrum of cyber information sharing: it allows 
private entities to share cyber threat indicators and defensive measures with 
each other and the Federal government, and facilitates the government’s 
sharing of such information with private entities. In short, it establishes a 
solid playing field for effectively preventing and mitigating cyber threats. 
In response to privacy concerns, CISA does specify the avenues 
through which, and the reasons why, the private sector may directly share 
information with the federal government: (1) reporting crimes, such as data 
breaches; (2) engaging in existing or future information sharing relationships; 
(3) conducting meetings, phone conversations, and other non-electronic 
format discussions; and (4) engaging in real-time automated sharing through 
the DHS portal. Of note, this construct, which was the subject of considerable 
debate, creates legal inconsistencies. For example, sharing information by 
phone directly with an FBI agent will provide liability protection, but sending 
the same information via email to the same agent offers no protection. It 
remains to be seen how the courts will view this discrepancy, or whether 
Congress will act to improve this construct. 
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E. Liability Protection 
 
CISA is not a free pass and does not incentivize unlawful conduct. 
Absent full compliance with the clear terms of the Act, there is no liability 
protection. CISA does offer incentives to encourage broader sharing,  
including antitrust and Freedom of Information Act exemptions, protection  
for proprietary information and trade secrets, and regulatory limits. 
 
F. Privacy Measures 
 
CISA was designed to protect privacy interests and includes 
numerous privacy protections, such as: 
 
• The definition of “cyber threat indicator” limits the information 
that can be shared. 
• Private entities can only monitor their networks, or the networks 
of others with specific written consent, for cybersecurity 
purposes. 
• Personal information not directly related to a cybersecurity threat 
must be removed before sharing. 
• All information received by the government must be handled 
under established procedures and privacy protections. 
• Most electronic sharing of cyber threat information with the 
Federal government must be through a DHS civilian portal. 
• The government may only use information it receives for 
specified purposes16  
 
G. Congressional Oversight 
 
As with other national security legislation, Congress maintains 
current insight into CISA’s implementation. The Executive branch must 
submit three separate reports to Congress, including an interagency 
inspectors general report and an independent report from the Comptroller 
General of the United States on the removal of personal information from 
cyber threat indicators. 
But these reports are not the beginning and end of congressional 
oversight. Congress is reviewing the interim guidelines and procedures 
required by CISA, which were submitted to Congress on February 16, 2016. 
Also, congressional committees will no doubt hold many hearings and 
																																								 																				
16 Given the current threat environment, this limitation may need to be re-examined. 
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briefings to understand the current threat environment and risks to the private 
sector and government, how CISA’s authorities are impacting the nation’s 
overall state of preparedness, and whether additional legislative measures are 
needed.  
 
IV. MOVING FORWARD 
 
With the enactment of CISA, private entities and the government may 
now benefit from mutual exchanges of information, in essence combining 
forces to prevent and mitigate cyber attacks. While a good beginning, there 
is more to do, here at home and abroad. On the domestic front, Congress must 
direct its attention to passing a federal data breach notification bill that clearly 
and effectively preempts state law, while resisting the temptation to impose 
onerous standards or regulations on American businesses. Currently, 
companies must comply with any one or all of 47 different state notification 
laws. A single, federal notification framework will allow private entities to 
focus their resources and attention on mitigating and preventing incidents, 
rather than navigating multiple legal requirements. 
Throughout the world, terrorists and nation states are seeking new 
ways to use cyber threats to spread fear and destruction. If we are to defeat 
these efforts, we must find some consensus among our allies and other 
nations on the basics of cybersecurity, such as what constitutes a cyber attack 
or an “act of war” in the realm of cyber space. With CISA, America has 
shown its leadership and commitment to improving the playing field. Now is 
the time for us to extend our leadership and work towards a more secure cyber 
world. 
 
